

THE
CHRISTIAN MAGAZINE.

BY MEMBERS OF MENDON ASSOCIATION.

VOL. IV.

JULY, 1827.

No. 7.

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CONDITIONS.

1. THE CHRISTIAN MAGAZINE shall contain 32 octavo pages, be executed as it respects type and paper in the style of the Christian Spectator, and afforded to subscribers at \$1,50 a volume, payable in advance; or \$2 paid at the end of six months.

2. Those who become responsible for five copies shall receive the sixth gratis.

3. No subscriptions are to be taken for less than a year; and if notice of discontinuance is not given before the issuing of the last number, subscribers will be considered as desiring it the succeeding year.

4. This volume shall be published in Boston; and though it will contain no more pages, it shall comprise considerably more matter, than either of the preceding volumes.

N. B. All communications to this work are to be sent, *post paid*, to the Centre Post-Office in Wrentham, Mass., directed to the Editors of the Christian Magazine, or to the office of T. R. MARVIN, Congress-street, Boston.

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1827.

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ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

It is the opinion of some, that there will be no punishment beyond the grave. It is the opinion of others, that the punishment of those who die in their sins, will be of temporary duration. The former of these opinions it is not my present object to examine. It is simply with the opinion of those, who admit the idea of a temporary punishment of the wicked in the future world, that I am at present concerned. And, in opposition to this latter opinion, it is my object to show, that, in the strictest sense of the term, the future punishment of the wicked will be endless. In the description of the process and result of the general judgment, which is contained in the twenty fifth chapter of Matthew, we are told, that, "before Christ shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats: and he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left." To those on his left hand, Christ will say; "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. And these," it is added, "shall go away into everlasting punishment."

The opinion has been advanced, that the separation between the

sheep and the goats, at the final judgment, will be a separation,—not between the righteous and the wicked,—but, between sinners and their sins,—that sinners will be placed on the right hand, but their sins, on the left,—that their sins will "go away into everlasting punishment," but their persons "into life eternal." But this opinion is stamped with all the marks of an absurdity. For, it supposes it possible for sin to exist by itself, separate from the sinner. A sin, however, is a personal act. We cannot conceive of its existence, independently of its action. To feel the absurdity of the opinion, that is now the subject of remark, let us read a part of Christ's description of the general judgment in accordance with it. 'Then shall he say to them on his left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed *sins*, into everlasting punishment. For, I was an hungered, and ye, *sins*, gave me no meat; I was thirsty, and ye, *sins*, gave me no drink; I was a stranger, and ye, *sins*, took me not in; naked, and ye, *sins*, clothed me not; sick, and in prison, and ye, *sins*, visited me not.' If, then, the theory before us is absurd, it will follow, that it will be individual persons of the human race, who, at the close of the final judgment, will "go away into everlasting punishment."

Here I am met with the critical remark, that the term, "*everlasting*," in this passage, does not necessarily signify endless duration. But, before examining this remark, it may be proper to adduce a few additional passages of a similar character. "Who shall be punished with *everlasting* destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." "To whom the mist of darkness is reserved *forever*." "To whom is reserved the blackness of darkness *forever*." "And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up *forever and ever*." "And, again, they said, Alleluia; and her smoke rose up *forever and ever*." "And the devil, that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night *forever and ever*." As it respects the words, *everlasting*, *eternal*, *forever*, and the phrase, *forever and ever*, contained in the passages which have been adduced, the best critics acknowledge, that, in the original, they primarily signify a strictly endless period of duration;—and that they are used to signify a limited period of duration, only when used in a figurative, subordinate sense. The same is true respecting the Greek word, rendered by the English words,—*everlasting* and *eternal*,—as it is used in classic writers. In the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and the best Greek authors generally, it has been proved by a distinguished critic to signify an absolutely endless period of duration. And to signify this, he says, they have no better word in their language. It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation, that the meaning of the words and phrases in question

must be determined by the nature of the subjects, to which they are applied. When, as in a few instances, these terms are applied to things in their own nature temporary, we naturally understand them to signify a limited period of duration. For example. The mountains and the hills are said to be *everlasting*. In this case, our knowledge of the temporary existence of the mountains and hills leads us to conclude, that the term—*everlasting*—is applied to them in a figurative, limited sense. But the same rule of interpretation will lead us to conclude, that the future punishment of the wicked will be endless. The word, *everlasting*, is used to represent the duration of future punishment. The subject, in relation to which that term is used, is the soul of man. But the human soul is absolutely eternal in its existence. Is it not, then, in view of the rule of interpretation that has been stated, a fair conclusion, that the future punishment of the wicked will be strictly eternal?

It is another acknowledged rule of interpretation, that the signification of the terms—*everlasting*, and *eternal*—is to be determined by the connexion in which they are used. Let us, then, apply this rule to the case before us. The duration of the future happiness of the righteous on the one hand, and the duration of the future misery of the wicked on the other, are both brought into view in the same passage of Scripture. "And these shall go away into *everlasting* punishment; but the righteous into life eternal." The terms—*everlasting*, and *eternal*—in this passage, are both translated from one and the same word in the original. Why are they not, then, as used in

this connexion, to be regarded as synonymous terms? It cannot be reasonably supposed, that Christ would have used a certain word in a limited sense, and, in the same verse, and with the same breath, without giving any intimation of his design to do it, would have used the same word in a sense infinitely different. But it will not be doubted, that, when he said,—“The righteous into life eternal,”—he used the word rendered *eternal*, to signify a strictly endless period of duration. How, then, can it be reasonably doubted, whether he used the same original word to signify a strictly endless period of duration, when, in the former part of the same verse, he said,—“These shall go away into everlasting punishment?”

The Greek phrase, rendered—*forever and ever*—is used eighteen times in the New Testament. In fifteen instances, it is used to represent the continuance of the perfections and government of God. In these instances it is, therefore, obviously used to signify endless duration. In one instance, it is used to represent the continuance of the reign of the righteous. Hence, in this instance, it is also used to signify endless duration. In the two remaining instances, it is used to represent the continuance of the punishment of the devil, of the beast, of the false prophet, and of those of mankind, who worship the beast and his image. It is, therefore, probable, in the proportion of sixteen to two, that in these two instances, as in the former sixteen, the phrase—*forever and ever*—is used to signify an absolutely interminable period of duration.

The texts concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, are a

clear proof of the eternity of future punishment. “The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come. He, that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness.” Now, the Gospel rejects every idea of the salvation of men without the forgiveness of their sins. Their sins must be pardoned, or they cannot be saved. Those, then, who commit the unpardonable sin, cannot be saved, and must, consequently, endure an endless punishment.

What Christ said concerning “the son of perdition,” is a clear proof of the eternity of future punishment. “Woe to that man, by whom the son of man is betrayed: good were it for that man, if he had never been born.” Let Judas be miserable for millions and millions of ages, and then be received to heaven, and it will be infinitely good for him to have been born. The period, during which he will be miserable, will be but as a moment, in comparison with a subsequent eternity of blessedness in heaven. It is repeatedly said concerning the lost in hell, that, “their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched.” How, then, can they be happy? So long as “their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched,” they must necessarily be miserable. But their worm will never die, nor will their fire be ever quenched. The future punishment of the wicked will, consequently, be endless.

But it is said, that it would be unjust for God to inflict upon sinners an endless punishment.

How does this appear? From his own language, fairly inter-

puted, it appears, that he has actually threatened to inflict endless punishment upon finally impenitent sinners. But this he surely would not have done, if it would be unjust for him to carry his threatening into execution. The moral perfection of his character forbids him to issue any threatnings, the execution of which would be inconsistent with retributive justice. It will, I presume, be admitted, that God may justly continue to punish the wicked in the future world, so long as they will *deserve* to be punished. It is, then, pertinent to inquire, whether they will not *deserve* to be punished, so long as their *guilt* will remain, and whether their *guilt* will not remain *forever*? If, as seems obvious, no limited term of punishment will completely expiate their guilt, that guilt will continue through interminable ages. And, as guilt and desert of punishment are, in the nature of things, inseparably connected, they will *deserve* to be, and may, therefore, *justly* be, punished through the whole period of their existence. In this connexion, it also deserves to be considered, whether those, who die impenitent, will not continue to sin throughout eternity. If, as we have reason to believe, all their exercises and actions will be one uninterrupted series of sins against God, then, they will, on this account, deserve to be punished forever. And God may justly continue to punish them forever for those sins, which they will continue to commit throughout eternity.

It is, again, said, that the *goodness* of God will not permit him to inflict an endless punishment upon any of mankind.

Could we have judged beforehand what plan the goodness of

God would lead him to adopt and pursue, we certainly should have concluded, that, instead of ever suffering either moral or natural evil to enter his dominions, he would cause holiness and happiness uninterruptedly to prevail throughout the universe. In a far different manner, however, has he actually ordered events. In the world, which we inhabit, moral evil, and its concomitant natural evils, as pain, sickness, sorrow and death, have reigned from the beginning. All these things have occurred under the government of God. That they *should* occur, is, therefore, consistent with his goodness. But if it is consistent with his goodness to bring the evils, that have been enumerated, upon his creatures in the present world, then, for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be equally consistent with his goodness to bring greater evils upon the wicked in the world to come. As long as it will remain true, that none, by searching, can find out God, or know the Almighty unto perfection, so long will it remain impossible for any man to prove, that the idea of endless punishment is irreconcilable with the divine goodness.

Again it is said, "Christ tasted death for every man; and, therefore, all mankind will be saved."

That Christ died for all, is a doctrine of Scripture. But from this fact it does not necessarily follow, that all men will be saved. Were the atonement of Christ, as some have supposed, a literal purchase, or the literal payment of a debt for the sinner, it would, indeed, be correct to infer from its universality the salvation of all mankind. But the atonement is not to be regarded as the literal payment of a debt. All, that it

has done, is, to render it consistent for God to pardon sin. It was made primarily on *God's* account, that he "might be just and the justifier of the believer in Jesus." It does not remove the ill desert of sinners, but leaves them as guilty and as deserving of punishment, as they would have been, had it not been made. Hence, God is under no obligation, simply on account of the atonement, to save a single sinner from merited punishment. The question, whether all, or but a part of mankind will be finally saved, entirely depends on other considerations than that of the universality of the atonement. Notwithstanding its universality, none will be savingly benefitted by it but believers in Jesus. Instead of saving unbelievers, it will serve to aggravate their future condemnation and misery. Having neglected so great salvation, they will be unable to escape. Having accounted the blood of the everlasting covenant an unholy thing, they will be thought worthy of a punishment peculiarly great in degree.

The opinion has often been advanced, that the future punishment of the wicked will be merely disciplinary,—designed to bring them to repentance and qualify them for heaven. But, on what is this opinion founded? Certainly, not on the testimony of Scripture. The fallen angels have been suffering in hell perhaps for six thousand years. But their sufferings have not *yet* had upon them the effect of a salutary discipline. From our being so frequently warned by Christ and his Apostles to beware of their seductions, we learn, that they are false and seductive still. But if a term of suffering of six thousand years continuance has

not brought them to repentance, there is no reason to think, that, how long-soever their term of suffering may be protracted, this effect will thereby be produced. As it respects the idea, that some of mankind will, after death, be brought to repentance and qualified for heaven, it seems wholly repugnant to the word of God. According to its declarations, as the character of man is at death, so it will continue to be forever. He, who is then righteous, will be righteous still. He, who is then holy, will be holy still. He, who is then unjust, will be unjust still. And he, who is then filthy, will be filthy still. Let not the reader, then, trust his eternal all upon the doctrine of universal salvation. Launch not into the untried and boundless ocean of eternity in so frail a bark, as this. Spend not your precious moments in making covenants with death, and agreements with hell. Your covenants with death will be eventually disannulled,—your agreements with hell will not stand,—and all your refuges of lies will be swept forever away. Flee to Christ. Take shelter in him, as the only ark of safety. Then will you be secure, when the heavens are passing away with a great noise—the elements are melting with fervent heat—the earth is consuming—and Jesus is himself descending "to execute judgment upon all."

F.

For the Christian Magazine.

ANSWER TO MORE INQUIRIES RESPECTING SUBMISSION.

Messrs. Editors,

IN my answer to the first Inquiries of Juvenis, upon the subject of submission, I meant to meet

them fairly, and, if possible, to make a reply that would be satisfactory. I have long since believed the sentiment to which Juvenis objects, and considered it capable of being set in a clear and satisfactory light. But I know too well the difficulties of altering the minds of men whose opinions are fixed, to be surprised that I have failed to produce conviction in the present case.

Juvenis thinks that I have misled, or taken a course calculated to mislead your readers, in regard to the real sentiments of Senex, by using the phrase "doubting Christians," instead of "those that have no hope." But if he will again attentively peruse the communication of Senex, he will there find, the phrase "doubting Christian," used precisely in the same sense in which I have used it. The following is an example. "I now ask whether unreserved submission to the divine disposal, is not directly calculated to remove the doubts of a *doubting Christian*, and whether any thing else can do it."

Juvenis thinks he might justly complain of me for saying that he, "by the form and manner of his first inquiries, had raised a great dust." It is not a little strange, that he should think of making this complaint, while he proceeds immediately to charge me with "appealing to popular prejudice, to break their effect;" and follows this with more than an insinuation that I had "ingeniously and slyly dodged by the point" in question. It seems that he intended to give me at least as much ground to complain of him, as he had of me.

He says, "I regret to find that the point of some of my first inquiries has been *mistaken* in the answer." This is well said, and

appears candid, and kind. But there is a difficulty in reconciling it with the charge which he afterwards makes against me "of *dodging* by this same point, with great ingenuity and rather *slyly*." I must certainly be a wonderful man "to *dodge*" "ingeniously" and "*slyly* by" a point which I did not see. But the fact is, I neither mistook the point of his inquiries, nor did I *dodge* by it. I saw it as clearly in his first communication as in his second, and I intended to meet it fairly, and I am now unable to see why I did not. In regard to the assertion of Senex, that "a Christian might be ignorant of his good estate, and consequently suppose that the glory of God might require his destruction," Juvenis inquired whether this ignorance is necessary? "The *point* of my inquiries," says he in his last communication, "was, whether the ignorance of a good man that he is a subject of saving grace, is of this kind necessary, and therefore the basis of an exercise essential to salvation, against which no objection could lie." It was with this *point* of his inquiries full in view, that I gave the following reply. "Whether this ignorance be *necessary* or not, is of no more consequence, as it respects the duty of unconditional submission, than the question whether it is *required* or not. If the penalty of the divine law is just, and an individual sincerely believes, as many a Christian has done, that the glory of God, and the good of his kingdom, require that this should be executed upon him; he certainly must submit to it, or oppose the supposed purpose of God. The fact that this mistake, or ignorance, is not necessary, does not prove that the consequent submission is not necessary,

any more than the fact, that a sinner's wickedness is not necessary, proves that the consequent duty of repentance is not necessary to salvation. It is believed that Juvenis himself will not deny, that a disposition to submit to the known, or supposed purpose of God, is a duty essential to salvation." Now whether the point of this inquiry was either mistaken, or evaded, your readers will judge.

But on this subject, Juvenis inquires, "What is the first duty of a man who is ignorant? Is it not to obtain light?" That is, as I understand him, what is the first duty of a Christian, who is ignorant that he is a Christian? Is it not to obtain evidence that he is a Christian? Very well, admit, if you please, that this is his first duty. How is he to obtain this evidence? Is it not by exercising those holy affections which God requires? Is there any other way in which a person can acquire a knowledge of his good estate? and is not submission to God one of those affections? Unconditional submission is not only a means, by which a doubting Christian *may* obtain evidence of his piety; but it is the means by which many a one has emerged from great and distressing darkness, into the light and liberty of the children of God. And there is no exercise of the mind which can give an individual good ground to hope, while he is conscious of an unwillingness, that God should do his pleasure with him, and every other creature.

After quoting the following questions from my answer to his inquiries, "Can a person be reconciled to God without being reconciled to his *law*? And can a person be reconciled to the law

of God without cordially approving of its *penalty*?" Juvenis replies, "To this I would say with all my heart *by no means*. But I would inquire, are we bound to be any more willing to accept the punishment of our iniquity, than God is to inflict it? And how far is God willing to inflict it? On any but the finally impenitent?" Now I will not charge Juvenis, with "*dodging stily*" by the point of my inquiries; but I cannot forbear to let your readers know *how* he has gotten by it. It is by leaving out the question that contained the *point* of them all, and answering only those which preceded it. The passage which contained these inquiries stands thus in my communication. "Can a person, I ask, be reconciled to God without being reconciled to his *law*? And can a person be reconciled to the law of God, without cordially approving of its *penalty*, as well as precept? *And can a person cordially approve of the penalty of the law, without being willing to SUFFER it, provided, in his view, the glory of God requires its execution upon him?*" This last question, with a view to which both the others were asked, and without which they had no perceptible relation to the subject discussed, Juvenis does not see fit to quote, and instead of giving any direct answer to it, proceeds to ask a number of other questions. Now as Juvenis has readily admitted, "that no person can be reconciled to God, without being reconciled to his law; and that no person can be reconciled to the law without cordially approving of its *penalty*," I should have been much obliged to him, if he had told me explicitly, whether a person can cordially approve of the penalty of the law

without being willing to *suffer* it, provided in his view, the glory of God requires its execution upon him? This certainly is a fair question. Juvenis does not, and cannot deny, that individuals are frequently in such circumstances, as really to believe that the glory of God does require that they should suffer the penalty of his law. The question, therefore, whether in these circumstances they ought to be willing to suffer it, is not only a very plain and simple question, but a truly important one. The proper answer to this question would decide the point in debate. If I can cordially approve of the penalty of the law, without being willing to suffer it, when I verily believe the glory of God requires it should be executed upon me, then I readily admit that the submission advocated by Senex is not essential to true reconciliation to God. But on the other hand, if I cannot cordially approve of his law, without being willing, in the circumstances supposed, to *suffer* it, all that Senex contends for must be admitted. I regret exceedingly that Juvenis did not favor me with an explicit answer to this question. If he had answered it in the negative, it would have rendered all further discussion unnecessary. If he had answered it in the affirmative, it would have left me only the labour of showing that a cordial approbation of the penalty of a law, which we are unwilling should, in the circumstances supposed, be inflicted, is an absurdity.

But I shall bestow a moment's attention upon the questions which Juvenis asks in the place in which he ought to have given an explicit answer to mine.—
“Are we bound to be any *more*

willing to accept the punishment of our iniquity, than God is to inflict it? And how far is God willing to inflict it? On any but the finally impenitent?” To these I reply, we are under obligation to accept the punishment of our iniquity, whenever we *suppose* it to be the will of God to inflict it. It is admitted on all hands, that we deserve to suffer the penalty of the law. Now if it appears to us that the glory of God requires our punishment, we cannot supremely desire the promotion of his glory, without a willingness to suffer it. There is no plainer truth than this: if we desire the promotion of God's glory more than any thing else, we shall cheerfully submit to whatever *appears* to us *necessary* to promote it. It is in vain to say here that we *may* be mistaken. True, we may be. But mistaken or not, if we are in the exercise of that love to God, which renders us more desirous of glorifying him, than saving ourselves, we *must* be willing to give up our own salvation, whenever it *appears* to be inconsistent with his glory. To suppose, that we ought not to be willing to suffer the penalty of the law, when this appears to be necessary to the promotion of God's glory, is to suppose, that we have a right to be unwilling that he should be glorified.

It is often said, and Juvenis has repeatedly insinuated, that a willingness to be lost is not required. But that love to God which will influence its subjects to desire the promotion of God's glory, above all things else, is required; and there are instances in which individuals have reason to fear that the glory of God requires their destruction. All impenitent sinners have reason to fear this.

They are now impenitent sinners, they have no evidence that they shall not continue impenitent sinners, and they know that the glory of God requires him to destroy all who do continue to sustain this character. They have *reason* then, I say, to *fear* that God intends to destroy them. This object of fear is a proper object of submission. Juvenis seems in each of his communications to reason as though no *unknown* evil could be an object of submission. But here he is greatly mistaken; and on this subject he and others, reason in a manner entirely different from that in which they reason on other subjects. They believe, and say, that those who have reason to *fear* death, ought to be *resigned* to death; and those who have reason to *fear* sickness, losses, disappointments, and trials, ought to be willing to suffer these things. They speak familiarly of persons being willing to die, while they are yet alive, and *know* not but they shall long continue to live; and they speak as familiarly of persons being willing to suffer any other affliction which they have reason to fear will, in the course of Providence, be brought upon them, without ever thinking that this language is improper, because they do not certainly *know* that it is the will of God, that they should suffer these things. In all ordinary cases, evil in prospect, which is properly an object of *fear*, is deemed a proper object of submission. Why then should not future and eternal punishment, if it be an evil which is deserved, and which God does actually inflict, be an object of submission to all who have reason to *fear* this? But Juvenis gets rid of all this by saying, that "this submis-

sion, this willingness to be destroyed in a future state, must be the act either of an impenitent sinner, or of a Christian. If it is the act of an impenitent sinner, it is worth nothing. In such a man, 'there is no good thing.' It must then, if God has required it, and it is essential to salvation, be the act of a new creature, a real Christian. But for a real Christian to be willing that God should destroy *him* in a future state, would imply a willingness that God should violate his promise, 'he that believeth shall be saved.'" Those who wish to see the sophistry of this reasoning satisfactorily exposed, are referred to the communication of Senex, to which Juvenis has undertaken to reply. A word is all that I deem it important to say in relation to it, and that is this: a willingness that God should execute the penalty of the law upon him, if he pleases, is one of those exercises of the mind by which the sinner *becomes* a saint. Juvenis might as well say of the first exercise of love, or the first exercise of repentance, or the first exercise of faith, of which the sinner is the subject, and by which he becomes a saint, that it is an act of an impenitent sinner, and of course worth nothing, as to say this of the submission in question. If it is a truth, that all impenitent sinners have reason to *fear* that the glory of God requires their destruction, they are all under obligation to submit to this, on the same principle that they are all under obligation to be willing that God should be glorified. And every saint, who has not so full an assurance of hope as to preclude the existence of *fear* on this subject is under obligation to exercise the same submission. And let it never be

forgotten, unconditional submission to God on this subject, is one of the best means of gaining evidence of our good estate, and of removing the ground of all fear.

In answer to the common objection that a willingness to suffer the just punishment of our sins in a future state, implies a willingness to remain impenitent, I said, "It is believed that many have been willing 'to accept the punishment of their iniquity,' without once *considering* that it is the purpose of God that all who are cast off shall remain impenitent." "This," says Juvenis, "may be true. But I would inquire, Can God be pleased with an exercise which owes its existence to the want of consideration? Has he suspended our salvation on such an exercise?" But I did not say, nor did I intimate, that this submission owed its *existence* to the want of consideration. This is an inference which Juvenis himself has drawn from my assertion, the absurdity of which he here attempts to charge upon me. This willingness owes its existence to a *regard to the glory of God*. The want of consideration in this case is only a circumstance which frequently attends the exercise of right as well as wrong affections. Does it follow from the fact, that there are unanticipated trials connected with the Christian life which Juvenis has chosen to live, that his entrance upon this course is owing to the want of consideration, and has nothing in it pleasing to God? I am sorry to say, that the kind of sophistry, here exposed, is frequently to be found in the inquiries and remarks of Juvenis. He uniformly represents ignorance as the *ground* of that submission which is con-

tended for by Senex; whereas this is only a circumstance which may call for its exercise, grounded, as it always is, upon a supreme regard to the glory of God. It is amusing to see how Juvenis, while he seems to smile at the idea of any thing being a duty incumbent upon us in consequence of our ignorance, which would not be a duty if we were rightly informed, admits this principle fully in his reasoning against it. He does this when he says, "it is the first duty of a man who is ignorant to obtain light." Here the duty which he inculcates is as much founded on ignorance, as that which he seems to discard for the same reason.

I admitted also, "that those who exercise the submission in question, do sometimes consider that all who are cast off will remain impenitent." The substance of all I said on this subject is what follows. "But allowing, as we must, that they do sometimes consider that all who are cast off, will remain impenitent, the difficulty presented is precisely the same in kind, with that which attends a willingness to remain imperfect, in this life. They can submit to this as the effect of a *divine purpose*, in the same manner in which they submit to any other evil which in itself they hate. Their submission to this, as the effect of a *divine purpose*, implies no approbation of it as *sin*, nor a disposition to disobey any divine precept; but is perfectly consistent with the most fervent desire to be holy, and with present efforts to continue so. If future impenitence could be viewed in no other light than as the mere criminal act of the sinner, that is, if the purpose of God could not be seen in it, it is readily granted, that it could not

be an object of submission, and that a willingness to be impenitent, in this sense, would be impenitence itself. But to submit to it as the effect of a divine purpose, is the same thing as to be willing in any other case that the counsel of God should stand." With respect to this, *Juvenis* says, "I beg leave to inquire, how any man that now lives, or ever will live, is to obtain this view of his own future impenitence as the effect of a divine purpose? How can he know that there is a purpose of God to this effect? Is it not manifestly impossible for him to know this without a special revelation? And what right has he to suppose it? If this view is impossible, in the case of every individual, how can any man be accused of any want of 'a disposition to submit to the purposes of God,' by being totally unreconciled to impenitence, either present, or future?"

Answer. The future impenitence of all who shall be cast off, is what *Juvenis* has supposed, and what he and others have repeatedly brought as an objection against the doctrine of unconditional submission. Now if it is a fact, that this is something which "no man has a right to suppose in his own case," it certainly cannot be any solid ground of objection to his willingness "to accept the punishment of his iniquity."

The reasoning of *Juvenis* on this subject is truly singular. It is substantially this. He in the first place, objects to a person's being willing "to accept the punishment of his iniquity," because it is the known purpose of God that all who are cast off shall remain in impenitence, and no man ought to submit to future impenitence. But when the ground of this objection is removed by

showing that even future impenitence may be an object of submission, when viewed as the effect of a divine purpose, he changes his ground and says, "no man that now lives, or ever will live, can obtain this view of his own future impenitence, as the effect of a divine purpose."—"He cannot know that there is a purpose of God to this effect,"—and "He has no right to suppose it." This is a very good illustration of a common saying: "Error is fated to run crooked."

Senex admitted, and I made the same concession, "that present submission is inconsistent with present disobedience." On this, says *Juvenis*, I would inquire, "Whether present impenitence is not as much the effect of a divine purpose as future? And if submission to God is inconsistent with present impenitence, why not to that which is future?"

The reason why present submission is inconsistent with present impenitence is, It is impossible that a person should be both penitent and impenitent at the same time. But it is not impossible for him to be penitent to-day, and impenitent to-morrow. To suppose a person submissive to the purpose of God respecting his present impenitence, is to suppose him to be obedient at the very time he is disobedient. But to suppose him now submissive to the purpose of God that he shall in future be impenitent, involves no such absurdity.

Juvenis further inquires, "Is there not an essential difference between God's decrees and their effects?—Because I am found to have a disposition to submit to the former, am I, therefore, to the latter? If I submit to the decrees of God, *as decrees*,—that is, as being what they are, holy,

benevolent, and wise, is not this enough?—Even considered as the effect of a divine purpose, is it not our duty to feel unreconciled to sin?" True, there is a difference between God's decrees and their effects. But it by no means follows from this circumstance, that we may submit to the former, and not to the latter. What does Juvenis mean, when he speaks of submitting to the decrees of God, *as decrees*, and, at the same time, refuses to submit to their effects? Is there, in fact, any such submission as this? Can there be any such submission as this? Submission to the decrees of God, if it means any thing, must mean a willingness that what he has decreed should take place. Let us suppose, now, that God has decreed to raise up a wicked prince, and to send him in the pride and stoutness of his heart to chastise America, as he once did the haughty king of Assyria, to scourge his people the Jews. Juvenis, if I understand him, could submit to this decree, "as a *decree*, that is, as being what it is, holy, benevolent, and wise." But he could not be willing that it should go into operation, because this would be submitting to its effects. He could not submit to have his country chastised by this wicked man, "who is God's sword," because this would be submitting to sin. "To sin, even considered as the *effect of a divine purpose*, it is our duty to be unreconciled." Now I ask, to what does this submission amount? If he is not willing that this prince should in the pride and stoutness of his heart, or in other words, with wicked motives, chastise this people, he does not submit to the decree of God, "as being what it is," because by the supposition, it

is the decree of God, that he should *thus* chastise us. If there is, as Juvenis contends, such a thing as submitting to God's decrees, without submitting to their effects, then I see not why a person may not submit to the decree of God that he should be sick, without ever being *willing* to be sick, and to his decree that his friends should be taken from him, without ever being *willing* that they should be taken from him, or to the decree of God that he should die, without ever for a moment feeling *willing* to die. How, I ask, do mankind *manifest* their submission to God? Is it not by submitting to the *effects* of his decrees? Does Juvenis consider it "enough" for a man to tell him that he submits "to God's decrees, as *decrees*," while he appears to be totally unreconciled to all their known effects? If Juvenis cannot defend himself against the theory which he opposes, without maintaining the distinction which he has made between submitting to the decrees of God, and their effects, he may rest assured, that he is engaged in a hopeless cause. There is not a plainer truth relating to submission, or to any other Christian duty, than that submission to the decrees of God, "as being what they are," implies a willingness that what is decreed should actually take place. I readily admit, and I have in every part of this discussion admitted, that sin, in itself considered, or viewed only as the criminal act of the sinner, is not an object of submission. But when viewed as the effect of a divine purpose, and as destined to be the means of ultimate good, although an abominable thing in itself, it is as really an object of submission as any other evil.

Again Juvenis inquires,
 "Does the purpose of God in regard to sin constitute any thing more than the *moral* certainty of its existence? Is it not a certainty of the same kind, as that which we feel, when we know that a habitual drunkard will become intoxicated, if a sufficient quantity of spirit is thrown in his way?"

To this I reply, that the purpose of God in regard to sin, constitutes an *absolute* certainty of its existence. It is *not* a *moral* certainty, such as we feel, when we know that a habitual drunkard will become intoxicated, if a sufficient quantity of spirit is thrown in his way; for this kind of certainty is nothing more than a very strong probability. Liquor may be placed before an habitual drunkard, and yet not be taken. But there is nothing in the universe more certain, than that every purpose of God shall be accomplished. Not only the agency of creatures, but his own agency is exerted for the accomplishment of all his purposes.

Near the close of my answer to the first inquiries of Juvenis, I said, "It is not, I apprehend, sufficiently considered, that submission always implies an *evil*, real or supposed, to be submitted to;" and added, "this thought pursued, will throw much light upon the subject." After quoting this passage, he says, "This thought I cannot pursue, I am stumbled at the threshold, I know that we are 'to submit ourselves to God.' But, with reverence would inquire, Is God an evil? Is his purpose an evil? Is his sovereignty? Is his law? Is any thing an evil that is in God? or any thing he has ever done? When my heart submits to the justice of God in destroying all

the impenitent in a future state, must I say to God, I feel that this thy justice is an evil, but I submit to it: or, is it my duty, and my privilege, to feel that I submit to that which is holy, and righteous, and lovely—essential to the happiness of the universe, and the glory of its author?"

Had Juvenis taken a little more pains to understand me, he might have saved the strength he has exhausted in this formidable array of interrogations. It is a pity that he should work himself out of breath, in beating the air. True, God is not an evil. But this by no means proves that his creatures must not submit to evil, in order to submit to him. It is because he is not evil, but good, that his creatures are bound to submit to the evils which he inflicts. It is true that his sovereignty, his law, his justice and all that is in God, is good. But Juvenis himself will not deny, that in the exercise of his sovereignty, in the execution of his law, and in the displays of his justice, he subjects his creatures to various kinds and degrees of suffering, which in itself is an evil. If he will have it, that this suffering is no *evil*, because "it is essential to the happiness of the universe, and the glory of its author," my reply is, there is then *no* evil in existence, for undoubtedly there is a sense in which every thing that takes place is "essential to the happiness of the universe, and the glory of its author." But to say there is no evil in existence, or that there is no evil attending the displays of God's sovereignty and justice, is to use terms contrary to the universal law of language, and to offer an insult to the common sense of mankind. I shall not here attempt to prove my

assertion, that submission always implies an *evil*, real or supposed, to be submitted to. My limits will not admit of this. But I shall take the liberty to request all who doubt this position, to consider whether they are ever conscious of *submitting* to that which implies no real or supposed evil? or to that which requires no self-denial. We speak familiarly of submitting to sickness, when desirous of health, and of submitting to death when desirous of life. But who was ever heard to speak of submitting to health when he was desirous of enjoying it, or of submitting to life when he wished to live? Now if it is a fact, as I presume all my readers except Juvenis will admit, that submission always respects an *evil*, real or supposed; it will not follow, as he contends, that sin cannot be an object of submission, because it is something which we do and ought to hate.

I regret that Juvenis, after having placed himself in an attitude of an inquirer, and solicited an answer to his numerous questions, should seem to grow impatient with his subject, and conclude his inquiries with a question which has the appearance of a design to reproach the opinion of his opponents. The proposal of this last question, in the terms in which he has expressed it, is in my view, a violation of decorum in religious controversy, which would justify me in passing it without notice. But I shall simply observe, that there is no more effectual antidote against every species of Antinomianism, than that disinterested affection which influences its subjects to submit cheerfully to every known or supposed purpose of God. On the other hand, that selfishness which loves God only for his fa-

vors, and which submits to him only upon condition of its own salvation, is, and ever has been, the very essence of Antinomianism. ALIUS JUVENIS.

THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.—BY BUNYANUS.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Love-self. I do not like Brother Thoughtful's notions respecting charity at all; and I am persuaded very few pilgrims do. They are too bigoted for this enlightened and liberal age.

No-law. I dislike them for another reason too. If I understand his scheme, he would have it, that we are still under obligation to keep the moral law, and bound to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbor as ourselves; just as Adam was before he fell.

Thoughtful. Certainly. The command is, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." I suppose we are bound to keep this command.

No-law. Not at all. Such commands are only given to teach us our impotence, and lead us to appropriate to ourselves by faith the finished righteousness of the Prince Immanuel. His obedience was perfect; and when it becomes ours by faith, we are perfect as our Father in heaven. In ourselves we are nothing but sin; but in him we are nothing but righteousness. He "has taken all our sins, and given us all his righteousness."

Thoughtful. If your scheme is true, I see no need of a believer's exercising repentance for any act of sin into which he may fall.

No-l. No. One of my favorite

authors says: "It would be a dishonor done to Christ, tarnishing the glory of his finished work, if a believer were ever to be sorry for his sin, or to bow down his head like a bulrush after the commission of it."

Th. Do you think the commission of sin can interrupt the believer's peace of mind, or his communion with God?

No-l. No. The same author says, "Sin can never disqualify him for any one mercy or blessing which God has promised him in his son Jesus Christ, nor can ever for one moment break his peace with God, which is his from eternity through the everlasting mediation of Christ; his, whatever sin he may commit, even robbery and murder." "Sin can do the children of God no harm, holiness no good."

Th. Your language shocks me. I did not expect any one would talk so, who professed any attachment to the blessed Redeemer.

No-l. You do not understand my scheme. It is more honorable to him than yours, or any other scheme of which good works are a part. I exalt his grace; but you depreciate it, by mixing your good works.

Th. I should rather think it would be dishonoring him in the highest degree to call myself a disciple of his, and yet live in the open and allowed violation of his commandments.

No-l. You not only depreciate the grace of God, but his justice too. For it would be as unjust to exact obedience of believers after their surety had rendered it for them, as to exact punishment of them after their surety had suffered that for them. One of my favorite authors says, "While the Mediator was in the world, he rendered a perfect ac-

tive obedience to the moral law, as the expanded covenant of works, in the room and stead of all those persons whom the Father gave him to be redeemed; and this righteousness is reckoned to all believers for their justification and adoption by the Father, as the legal, perfect, and meritorious cause of the same." He says also, "The Father justifies every one of the elect in the moment in which he is so united to Christ as to believe in him, in consequence of the perfect vicarious righteousness of Christ, which is imputed to the believer, because by the mystical union it has actually become his righteousness, according to covenant." Also, "None can be pronounced by the judicial sentence of God to be just, but those that are perfectly just; and righteousness can be reckoned or imputed to none but to those that possess it." He also says, "while the Mediator was in our world, he endured in his sufferings even unto death, the penalty of the violated law, in the place of all who were given to him by the Father to be redeemed; so that all the sins of believers, past, present, and to come, were legally punished in him, to the full satisfaction of divine justice." Another favorite author asks, "Can they, for whom this satisfaction has been made, be punished for the same sins, for which justice is declared to be satisfied? How can the same crimes be punished twice over in a just government?" And another affirms, "The justice of God renders their salvation absolutely certain; because it would be incompatible with the first principles of equity to punish in their own persons those for whose sins Christ has made ample satisfaction." In view of what these

learned Doctors say, I infer, that neither sufferings nor obedience can be justly exacted of us believers, both having been rendered for us, to the full satisfaction of justice, by our great Surety.

Th. It seems to me that this whole scheme is contrary to scripture, reason, and common sense; and destructive of all true piety and morality. Religion consists in conformity to God, in heart and in life.

No-l. No. Religion consists in faith. You talk like a legalist, and you oppose salvation by grace, as I told you once before.

Th. I consider your faith as no better than your works. It consists in believing that "Christ has taken all your sins, and given you all his righteousness," which is not true with respect to any; and if it were, you have no evidence that it is with respect to yourself.

No-l. Not true with respect to any! Do you think those learned Doctors, to whom I have referred, have taught what is not true? You must not accuse such great men of teaching unsound doctrine.

Th. They may have believed what they taught; but if they did, that does not make it true. I learn from the divine oracles to call no man master on earth; but to try every thing by "the law and the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them."

No-l. I will cite another learned Doctor, in confirmation of what I have said already: He observes, "Our sins so became Christ's, that he stood the sinner in our stead, and we discharged. It is the iniquity itself that the Lord laid upon Christ; I mean, it is the fault of the transgression

itself. To speak more plainly; hast thou been an idolater, a blasphemer, a murderer, a thief, a liar, or a drunkard? If thou hast part in the Lord, all these transgressions of thine become actually the transgressions of Christ. Nor are we so completely sinful, but Christ being made sin was as completely sinful as we." What do you say to this?

Th. I say I abhor such language, and that whole scheme which justifies it.

No-l. Take heed, then, lest seeking to be justified by the law, you prove that you have no interest in the Redeemer, and fall under the curse.

Th. I thank you for your admonition. I am sensible that I need to take heed lest I be deceived by myself or others. But it is your system, and not mine, which makes justification to be by the law.

No-l. How does that appear?

Th. You hold that Christ both obeyed the law for us, and suffered its penalty for us, and so satisfied all its demands upon us; and if so I conclude the law itself must grant our discharge. And agreeably to this, one of the authors you cited, says, "This righteousness [of Christ] is reckoned to all believers for their justification, as the *legal* cause of the same." He also says, "None can be pronounced by the judicial sentence of God to be just, but those that are perfectly just."—And he says this of believers, to show how they are justified. His plain meaning is, that believers are, in the act of justification, pronounced perfectly just; and he thinks they are so. But those who are perfectly just, are justified by the law. When a perfectly just man is brought to trial, the law justifies him, and sets

him at liberty. And when a man who has committed a crime has paid the fine which the law imposes, or has been imprisoned as long as the law requires, and is then discharged, his discharge is by the law, and not by grace or pardon. He would be treated unjustly if he were detained longer. He claims his discharge as a matter of right; he does not ask it as a favor. And accordingly, another of your same favorite authors speaks of its being right to "challenge an acquittance at the hand of God," and says, "He, who as the Judge of heaven and earth must always do right, is said to justify the ungodly—and that out of justice." Again, "God, as he is a just God, cannot condemn the believer, since Christ has satisfied for his sins." Now, it is plain, that if God cannot justly condemn, if he cannot justly punish, then he only does bare justice when he discharges; he exercises no grace in the matter.

No-l. But there was grace in providing a Surety to make satisfaction for us.

Th. Yes. And it is a part of my system, as well as of yours, that the gift of a Saviour was an act of grace. But while that is all the grace your system acknowledges, mine makes every step of our salvation an act of grace. It was an act of grace to provide a Saviour; it is an act of grace to grant us a season of probation; it is an act of grace to change our hearts; it is an act of grace to pardon our sins; it is an act of grace to bear with us from day to day while committing new sins; and it will be an act of grace to receive us to heaven, where we shall be monuments of grace forever. But if your system is true, there is no grace but in the gift of a Saviour. For if Christ

"has taken all our sins, and given us all his righteousness," we are no longer subjects of grace, any more than the angels in heaven. Your system, therefore, instead of exalting and magnifying the grace of the gospel, takes away a great part of it, and it makes the act of justification to be by the law, a proper *legal* act, and not an act of grace.

No l. How does your system make every step of the sinner's salvation an act of grace? I see not how it can be, but only as each step is a consequence of the gracious gift of a Saviour. And if that would make it an act of grace, my system would do it.

Th. Justice requires that each individual should be treated according to his deserts. Sin deserves punishment; righteousness deserves no punishment. If all our sins are given to Christ, and all his righteousness is given to us, we no longer deserve punishment. Grace is favor to the ill deserving. If all our sins are taken away, we have none left for which we can deserve any punishment; and therefore we cannot be subjects of grace. No favor shown to the angels in heaven can be an act of grace, because they deserve no punishment. It is only where justice requires punishment that grace can be exercised. I take these to be acknowledged principles, are they not?

No-l. I am not inclined to dispute them now. Go on.

Th. My scheme is, that the moral law is the only rule of right, to which all intelligent beings are bound to conform, because it is right; and that this obligation cannot be fulfilled by any one for another, because the requirement is, "thou shalt love;" not *thou* or some other in thy room.

Men have broken this law, and exposed themselves to its curse. Every sin deserves the divine disapprobation now, and will forever, since no length of duration can change its nature. The punishment threatened to sinners is a proper token of that disapprobation. The penalty of the law, therefore, is endless punishment. This we all deserve for our sins, and must always deserve, whether it is inflicted or not, since it will always remain true that we have sinned. This punishment must be inflicted, unless some other way can be found out, by which the divine disapprobation of sin can be as fully and as clearly expressed as it would be in the infliction of the punishment, in which case only it will be consistent for that punishment to be dispensed with by forgiveness. Such a way has been found out. God has provided a Saviour for those who deserve to perish forever. This was an act of grace. The Lord Jesus Christ made an atonement for sin by the shedding of his blood on the cross. His active obedience was rendered for himself, and could not in the nature of the thing be rendered for any but himself. He was as much bound to do right, as any other being can be. And it was necessary that he should be perfectly obedient for himself in order to be qualified to make atonement by his blood, for otherwise he could not have been "a lamb without blemish." In suffering death, he did not suffer the penalty of the law, which is eternal punishment; but he suffered enough, considering the dignity of his person, to make as clear an expression of God's feelings towards sin, as would have been made by the infliction of that penalty upon sinners. The demands of the law

upon us remain in their full force, not at all weakened, but rather made stronger by the death of Christ, that event having laid us under additional obligations. Its demand of punishment, however, though still perfectly just, can now be consistently remitted, in the case of those who consent unto the law, and perform the conditions of repentance and faith; because the ends to be answered by their punishment are secured in another way. In consequence of the death of Christ, the offer of pardon is freely made to all without discrimination, and is an act of grace, because all deserve to be cast off without any such offer. A period of probation is allowed, in which men have opportunity to consider their ways, and secure the offered mercy, by a compliance with the prescribed conditions. This is an act of grace, because all deserve instant destruction. All, however, with one consent, reject the offer, and would continue to reject it were nothing more done for them. But God sends his Holy Spirit, to make some willing in the day of his power, by changing their hearts. This is an act of grace, because the gift of the Holy Spirit is a favor which none deserve. When they are made willing, and become holy in the temper of their minds, that does not alter the fact that they have sinned before, and therefore does not take away their desert of punishment for their past sins. It is an act of grace, therefore, to exempt them from that punishment, by granting them remission of sins. And as those who are regenerated continue to be guilty of their old sins, though the punishment of them is remitted, and also to commit new sins, from day to day, it is an act of grace to

spare them from day to day, under their increasing ill desert. And as in the great day it will still be true that they have sinned, it will be true then that they deserve punishment, and therefore it will be an act of grace then to acquit them from it in the presence of the assembled universe. And as it will continue to be true forever that they have committed the sins they have, it will continue to be true forever that they deserve to be punished for them; and therefore, while they reign for ever in heaven, they will be everlasting monuments of grace, rich, free, distinguishing, and sovereign grace. And the most eminent saints on earth, on account of the continuance of their ill desert for past sins, and their increasing ill desert for their daily new sins, feel bound, and feel disposed, to humble themselves before God, and lie very low before him, to acknowledge themselves sinners, exceedingly vile, and to ask every favor at his hand as a free gift to the ill deserving. The language of the scripture saints is highly expressive of such feelings; and such are the feelings of all on earth who resemble them.

No-l. You speak of believers becoming *holy*, as if you supposed they were to be *holy in themselves*. Here is the lurking legality of your scheme, which, though you talk so much about grace, leads you to mix your own works with the righteousness of Christ, as though his finished work needed helping out with some additions of ours.

Ardent. Are not believers spoken of in the scriptures as being "partakers of the divine nature," and "partakers of his holiness?" And is it not plainly declared,

that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord?"

No-l. Yes. But one of the learned Doctors before referred to, informs us, that in the last mentioned passage, and I should think also in the others, "*holiness* means separation to God, and not any quality, or grace, or habit of mind;" or else it means "the holiness of Christ *imputed* to us, and so made ours in a judicial or legal respect." Believers are "chosen in Christ, to be holy *in him*, even *in him*; but not so as to be holy *in themselves*."

Th. If they are not holy in themselves, they are in themselves unholy and impure, and are not prepared for a holy heaven, where no unclean thing shall enter. None but "the pure in heart shall see God." I am aware that the word *holiness* sometimes means separation to God, as when applied to places, buildings, vessels, and the like, under the old dispensation. But this is not its only meaning. The holiness of God is not of this kind. It is an exercise of his heart. And when believers are said to be "partakers of his holiness," it means that they are holy in the same sense, with the same kind of holiness that he is. They have holy exercises of heart. They are of the same temper of mind that he is; so that they have "fellowship with the Father and with the Son." Without such holiness of heart, which is his own exercise, there is no communion, no oneness of feeling between the believer and the Father. Heaven itself would be no heaven to the man who does not feel as God feels. And this is a sufficient reason, if there were no other, why it is true that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord." If

learned Doctors say, I infer, that neither sufferings nor obedience can be justly exacted of us believers, both having been rendered for us, to the full satisfaction of justice, by our great Surety.

Th. It seems to me that this whole scheme is contrary to scripture, reason, and common sense; and destructive of all true piety and morality. Religion consists in conformity to God, in heart and in life.

No-l. No. Religion consists in faith. You talk like a legalist, and you oppose salvation by grace, as I told you once before.

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No-l. I am not inclined to dispute them now. Go on.

Th. My scheme is, that the moral law is the only rule of right, to which all intelligent beings are bound to conform, because it is right; and that this obligation cannot be fulfilled by any one for another, because the requirement is, "*thou* shalt love;" not *thou* or some other in thy room.

Men have broken this law, and exposed themselves to its curse. Every sin deserves the divine disapprobation now, and will forever, since no length of duration can change its nature. The punishment threatened to sinners is a proper token of that disapprobation. The penalty of the law, therefore, is endless punishment. This we all deserve for our sins, and must always deserve, whether it is inflicted or not, since it will always remain true that we have sinned. This punishment must be inflicted, unless some other way can be found out, by which the divine disapprobation of sin can be as fully and as clearly expressed as it would be in the infliction of the punishment, in which case only it will be consistent for that punishment to be dispensed with by forgiveness. Such a way has been found out. God has provided a Saviour for those who deserve to perish forever. This was an act of grace. The Lord Jesus Christ made an atonement for sin by the shedding of his blood on the cross. His active obedience was rendered for himself, and could not in the nature of the thing be rendered for any but himself. He was as much bound to do right, as any other being can be. And it was necessary that he should be perfectly obedient for himself in order to be qualified to make atonement by his blood, for otherwise he could not have been "a lamb without blemish." In suffering death, he did not suffer the penalty of the law, which is eternal punishment; but he suffered enough, considering the dignity of his person, to make as clear an expression of God's feelings towards sin, as would have been made by the infliction of that penalty upon sinners. The demands of the law

upon us remain in their full force, not at all weakened, but rather made stronger by the death of Christ, that event having laid us under additional obligations. Its demand of punishment, however, though still perfectly just, can now be consistently remitted, in the case of those who consent unto the law, and perform the conditions of repentance and faith; because the ends to be answered by their punishment are secured in another way. In consequence of the death of Christ, the offer of pardon is freely made to all without discrimination, and is an act of grace, because all deserve to be cast off without any such offer. A period of probation is allowed, in which men have opportunity to consider their ways, and secure the offered mercy, by a compliance with the prescribed conditions. This is an act of grace, because all deserve instant destruction. All, however, with one consent, reject the offer, and would continue to reject it were nothing more done for them. But God sends his Holy Spirit, to make some willing in the day of his power, by changing their hearts. This is an act of grace, because the gift of the Holy Spirit is a favor which none deserve. When they are made willing, and become holy in the temper of their minds, that does not alter the fact that they have sinned before, and therefore does not take away their desert of punishment for their past sins. It is an act of grace, therefore, to exempt them from that punishment, by granting them remission of sins. And as those who are regenerated continue to be guilty of their old sins, though the punishment of them is remitted, and also to commit new sins, from day to day, it is an act of grace to

spare them from day to day, under their increasing ill desert. And as in the great day it will still be true that they have sinned, it will be true then that they deserve punishment, and therefore it will be an act of grace then to acquit them from it in the presence of the assembled universe. And as it will continue to be true forever that they have committed the sins they have, it will continue to be true forever that they deserve to be punished for them; and therefore, while they reign for ever in heaven, they will be everlasting monuments of grace, rich, free, distinguishing, and sovereign grace. And the most eminent saints on earth, on account of the continuance of their ill desert for past sins, and their increasing ill desert for their daily new sins, feel bound, and feel disposed, to humble themselves before God, and lie very low before him, to acknowledge themselves sinners, exceedingly vile, and to ask every favor at his hand as a free gift to the ill deserving. The language of the scripture saints is highly expressive of such feelings; and such are the feelings of all on earth who resemble them.

No-l. You speak of believers becoming *holy*, as if you supposed they were to be *holy in themselves*. Here is the lurking legality of your scheme, which, though you talk so much about grace, leads you to mix your own works with the righteousness of Christ, as though his finished work needed helping out with some additions of ours.

Ardent. Are not believers spoken of in the scriptures as being "partakers of the divine nature," and "partakers of his holiness?" And is it not plainly declared,

that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord?"

No-l. Yes. But one of the learned Doctors before referred to, informs us, that in the last mentioned passage, and I should think also in the others, "*holiness* means separation to God, and not any quality, or grace, or habit of mind;" or else it means "the holiness of Christ *imputed* to us, and so made ours in a judicial or legal respect." Believers are "chosen in Christ, to be holy *in him*, even *in him*; but not so as to be holy *in themselves*."

Th. If they are not holy in themselves, they are in themselves unholy and impure, and are not prepared for a holy heaven, where no unclean thing shall enter. None but "the pure in heart shall see God." I am aware that the word *holiness* sometimes means separation to God, as when applied to places, buildings, vessels, and the like, under the old dispensation. But this is not its only meaning. The holiness of God is not of this kind. It is an exercise of his heart. And when believers are said to be "partakers of his holiness," it means that they are holy in the same sense, with the same kind of holiness that he is. They have holy exercises of heart. They are of the same temper of mind that he is; so that they have "fellowship with the Father and with the Son." Without such holiness of heart, which is his own exercise, there is no communion, no oneness of feeling between the believer and the Father. Heaven itself would be no heaven to the man who does not feel as God feels. And this is a sufficient reason, if there were no other, why it is true that "without holiness no man shall see the Lord." If

all the holiness in the universe were *imputed* to him, it would do nothing towards qualifying him to enjoy heaven, till the temper of his heart was made to accord with the temper of heaven. If you have not the same mind that was in Christ, if you have not his Spirit abiding in you and renewing you after his moral image, nothing is more certain than that you are none of his. It is absurd to suppose any to be his *disciples* who never do what he commands. But his commands require perfect conformity to the moral law. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and thy neighbor as thyself. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. As he which hath called you is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of conversation." The promises to change the heart are promises to produce a conformity to the moral law. "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit

will I put within you; and I will *take away* the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and *cause you to walk in my statutes*, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them." It is a plain and decisive declaration, "Every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love." But it is also declared, "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law; for love is the fulfilling of the law." And it is written, "He that *doeth righteousness* is righteous, even as He is righteous. He that committeeth sin is of the devil. If ye know that he is righteous, ye know that every one that *doeth righteousness* is born of Him. Hereby we do know that we know Him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know Him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."

Review.

For the Christian Magazine.

REVIEW OF TRACTS published by the American Unitarian Association.

[Continued from page 189.]

THE fourth Tract in the series under consideration is entitled "*Omniscience the attribute of the Father only.*" It is "a reprint of a Sermon, delivered some years since in England, by Rev. Joseph Hutton," and is founded on Mark xiii. 32, "*But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.*" We have examined the Sermon with con-

siderable attention, and give the following as an analysis of its contents: The twelve first pages may be regarded as an *introduction*, in which the author attempts to vindicate himself and his brethren from the charge of degrading the Saviour; insisting, that if they refuse him divine honors, it is not because they do not love him—that, if they are in error, still they are safe—that others, whom they "deem in gross error," are as safe as they—that Unitarians are most sincere in their views of religious truth—and, of course, that they

ought not to be denied the countenance and fellowship of Orthodox believers. On page 13th, Mr. Hutton introduces his text; and, after asserting once and again, in the next three pages, that Christ was ignorant of the day and hour of which he spake, infers that he did not possess the attribute of omniscience, and consequently could not be a divine person. From the 16th page to the 23d, the author considers the Trinitarian interpretation of his text, that *Christ here speaks, not as God, but merely as man*—affirming that the supposition is absurd, and that it has not been acquiesced in by some Trinitarians, particularly by Mr. Wardlaw. Mr. H. next introduces several classes of passages, to prove the limited knowledge of the Saviour; specially those, in which he speaks of his doctrines as not his own—in which he is represented as *praying*, and as being *tempted*—and “which imply the limitation of any other of his attributes.” (pp. 23—34.) He then concludes, with renewedly protesting his sincerity, and fervent charity, though not his infallibility; and with exhorting his hearers to search the scriptures for themselves.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen, that the main subject in dispute between Mr. Hutton and ourselves, may be reduced to a very narrow compass. It may be resolved into this one question, *Was the divine nature so united with human nature in the person of Christ, that he could consistently speak, and be spoken of, both as God, and as man?* If this question is determined in the negative, then we admit that Mr. Hutton’s text, and the other passages which he has cited, are full to his purpose, and go to disprove the divinity of the Saviour—dis-

proving, at the same time however, the divine authority of the *Scriptures*, as being wholly irreconcilable, one part with another. But if the question be determined in the affirmative, then clearly the passages, on which he relies, prove nothing to his purpose. If the divine and human natures were so united in the person of Christ, that he could consistently speak, and be spoken of, both as God, and as man; then he might, as man, represent himself to be ignorant of the hour of judgment, and yet, as God, possess “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” He might, as man, and as the constituted mediator between God and men, receive his instructions from the Father—might offer supplications to the Father—he might “in all points be tempted, like as” other men—his human attributes might all be limited—in a word, all that Mr. H. has alleged might be true—and yet none of it afford the least evidence that Christ was not a divine person. We repeat it, therefore, as fairly involving the whole subject in dispute, *Was the divine nature so united with human nature in the person of Christ, that he could consistently speak, and be spoken of, both as God, and as man?*

This question, it will be seen, is one of mere *fact*, to be determined wholly by the testimony of Scripture. And it is not necessary that those, who answer it in the affirmative, should go into all the *hows* and the *wherefores*, which may be made to grow out of it—that they should be able to explain, or to understand, the *manner*, in which the divine and human natures are united, in the person of their Saviour. Whether creatures such as we, can comprehend this mysterious union or

not, and whether it seem reasonable to us or not, is of very little consequence. God knows, undoubtedly, what the truth is; and the simple point which it concerns us to know is, *What hath God revealed? What is the decision of the Scriptures?*

Let it be observed then, in the first place, that the Scriptures represent the Lord Jesus Christ as possessing a *divine* nature; or as being, in some sense, *God*. We cannot here go into a citation of passages in support of this proposition; nor do we think it necessary, as full proof of it has been exhibited in a former part of this Review.* Suffice it to say, that the same scriptural arguments, which show the divine nature of the Father, may be urged to show the divine nature of the Son. The Father is denominated Lord, and God, and mighty God, and Jehovah; and so is the Son. The Father is represented as eternal, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent; and so is the Son. The Father is spoken of as the creator, preserver, governor, and final judge of the world; and so is the Son. The Father is exhibited as a proper object of worship, to saints on earth, and angels in heaven; and so is the Son. The Father too asserts his own divinity; and so does the Son. "*I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, which is, which was, and which is to come, the Almighty.*"†

The Scriptures farther represent the Lord Jesus Christ as possessing *human* nature; or as being in some sense, a *man*. We have as much evidence that he was a man, as that any other person mentioned in the Bible was a man. He was born as a man; he grew as a man; he appeared,

lived, suffered, and died, as a man. In numerous instances, he is expressly denominated a man—"the man Christ Jesus."

Yet this mysterious and glorious personage, whose very name is "*Wonderful*"—constitutes but *one* person. He is not numerically two, but *one*—"one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him."

If now we put together these three particulars, each of which is supported by divine testimony; we shall have from them the following proposition: *The Lord Jesus Christ possesses both a divine and human nature, united in one person.* In other words, he is "*God, manifest in the flesh.*" He is "*the Word, made flesh.*" Being in one sense a *man*, he really is—what he was once understood as making himself to be—in another sense, *God*. But if this is the fact, then he may, with perfect truth and propriety, speak, and be spoken of, both as *God*, and as *man*. He may be represented as born of a woman—and yet as the Creator and Preserver of worlds; as "*crucified through weakness*"—and as possessing "*all power, in heaven and on earth;*" as not knowing the day or the hour of judgment—and as knowing literally *all things*. We repeat here, what we had occasion to say on a previous page,‡ we fully believe all those passages, which represent the Lord Jesus as, in some sense, inferior to the Father. We believe them in their most obvious sense.—They express a sentiment which is dear, and even *essential*, to our faith, as Christians. And we as fully believe another class of passages, which invest this same Jesus with the glories of the Godhead—which represent him as equal to,

* pp. 153, 154. † Rev. i. 8, 11 and xxii. 13.

‡ p. 181.

and one with, the Father Almighty.

As the discourse before us denies the *omniscience* of Christ, it may be proper to adduce the testimony of Scripture to this particular point. It is said of him by one of the Evangelists, that "he *knew all men*, and needed not that any should testify of man, for he *knew what was in man*." "He *knew*, from the beginning, *who they were that believed not*." Say the disciples to him, on a certain occasion, "Now we are sure, that thou *knowest all things*." "Lord," says Peter, "thou *knowest all things*, thou *knowest that I love thee*." He knew the thoughts and designs of those with whom he conversed; and he says of himself, "*I am he which searcheth the reins and the heart*."* And we may farther ask, What less than omniscience can qualify the Saviour to be the final judge of angels and men? These, and other similar representations of Scripture—which are not so much as noticed in the Sermon before us—are recommended to the future consideration of those, who deny divine attributes and honors to Christ, and assert, from partial views of the subject, that "omniscience is the attribute of the Father only."

The Tract here examined is to us rather a spiritless production, having less pith and substance than some in the series, and not calculated to produce much effect any way. It is written in a diffuse and complimentary strain, and is distinguished chiefly for its insipidity, and for a fulsome and affected display of charity. The author assures us, once and again, that himself and those who agree with him are sincere in their views

and pure and holy in their intentions. And "those who differ most widely from him," he believes are as sincere, as good, and as safe, as they. "They may be in error; but what then? They are in charity; and we do not question their final acceptance with the Father." (p. 6.)

The writer of the *next Tract*, "On the Religious Phraseology of the New Testament, and of the present day," begins with complaining of the vagueness and obscurity of our ideas on the subject of religion—attributing the evil, partly to the spiritual nature of religion, partly to indifference, but especially to the words and phrases in which our ideas on this subject are conveyed. He remarks, first, "on the religious phraseology of the New Testament," and secondly, on that "of the present day." Under the first of these divisions, he considers "the appellations given to Christianity, such as *covenant, testament, kingdom of God, and mystery*; the word by which is expressed "the good or benefit, which Christianity was principally designed to communicate," viz. *salvation*; the prescribed "way of obtaining this good or benefit"—by "exertion on our part," while we depend on the proffered aid of heaven; and "the method in which God bestows his favor, commonly designated by the terms *forgiveness, and justification*."—Under the second division, he "notices three kinds of phrases—those which describe the *process of becoming religious*; those which describe the *thing itself*; and those which consist of the *titles* that are appropriated to persons considered religious." Each of these two divisions is followed by general remarks.

The ostensible object of this

* John ii. 24, and vi. 64, and xvi. 30, and xxi. 17. Mat. ix. 4. Rev. ii. 23.

publication is an important one. It is to explain the language of the New Testament, and to free religion from the burthen of a technical phraseology, which is regarded by the author as worse than useless. And there are passages in the book itself, to which, could they be separated from the remainder, we should offer no objection. For instance, in the explanation given of the words covenant and testament—of the consistency of divine and human agency in the formation of religious character—and of forgiveness and justification, as meaning the same—the views of the writer are not materially different from our own. There are other parts, however, which we consider exceptionable, and to these our attention will be chiefly directed.

In several instances, the author, instead of explaining the phraseology of Scripture, *obscures* and *confounds* it. "*Salvation*," he says, "is the great benefit offered in the gospel." But what are we to understand by salvation? It "is *purity of heart*—it is *virtue* and *piety*. The salvation offered in the Scriptures is in itself and essentially that *holiness*, which they inculcate." (p. 10.) Salvation then, according to the new theological nomenclature, is the same as holiness. But suppose the terms be used interchangeably, the one for the other. "Behold now is the accepted time; behold now is the day of *holiness*. How shall we escape, if we neglect so great *holiness*? Perfecting *salvation* in the fear of God."

If, to avoid the confusion introduced by this strange definition of the word salvation, it be said that, besides holiness, it includes also the happiness resulting from it; we reply that this is not its meaning. Salvation implies previous

loss, and is itself *deliverance* from that loss. In a religious sense, it signifies deliverance from sin, and from misery; but not, unless by consequence, the possession of either holiness or happiness.—Angels are both holy and happy; but they are not the subjects of salvation. They have not been saved, for they were never lost.

Speaking upon *faith*, our author inquires, "Is it better than love, or forgiveness? Is it better than obedience? Rather is it not essentially the *same thing*? No attentive reader of the New Testament can doubt that it is." (p. 19.) Faith, then, according to this critic upon Scripture phraseology, is the same as love, forgiveness, and obedience. Consequently, love, forgiveness, and obedience must be the same as faith. And by a further consequence, since things which are equal to the same are equal to one another, love, forgiveness, and obedience, must be of the same import. If the writer means, that these exercises are the same, because they are all branches of religious duty; then we reply, that he has expressed his meaning very loosely: For on this principle, he might say, that holy joy, and holy sorrow, that keeping the Sabbath and speaking the truth, are all the same. But if he means that they are literally the same, so that the terms expressing them may be used, the one for the other; then he confounds the plainest distinctions, and sets up a principle which cannot be carried through a single chapter of the New Testament, without rendering it perfectly unintelligible.

Forgiveness, we are informed by this writer, is "a disposition in God. It is a disposition to deal mercifully with us." (p. 20.) But

according to this definition of forgiveness, who among the sinful creatures of God are not already forgiven? Who are they, towards whom he has no disposition, could it be consistent, to deal mercifully? And besides, what do we mean when we *pray* for forgiveness? Do we pray that God would cherish towards us a merciful disposition? Do we believe he ever cherished, towards any of his creatures, an unmerciful disposition? And still farther, it may be asked; why should the scriptural signification of the term forgiveness, be so totally different from that in common use? The Judge on the bench, while pronouncing the sentence of the law, may cherish towards the criminal a merciful disposition; but this is not forgiving him. And the chief magistrate, in whom is vested the right to pardon, may cherish towards the convict a merciful disposition, even to the moment of his execution; but neither is this forgiving him. It certainly became one, who was complaining of the obscurity of scriptural language, and was writing with a view to open and explain it, not to "darken counsel by words without knowledge," and thus to obscure and confound it the more.

Our author finds fault, in some instances, with "the religious phraseology of the New Testament," not, as we think, because it does not express the sentiment intended, but because this sentiment does not comport with his own views. He complains that the phrases "born again, created anew," &c. have been arrayed in opposition to "the slow process of spiritual renovation," and have given rise to the notion of "an instantaneous change" of heart. (p. 12.) We are aware, indeed,

that these phrases have been thus used; and thus, we are satisfied, they ought to be used. For the very reason that our author wishes them to be set aside, we cannot consent to set them aside. The sentiment they express is as welcome to us, as it can be unwelcome to him. "The slow process of spiritual renovation!" How long does it take a person to turn from the exercise of sin, to the exercise of holiness? "The slow process of spiritual renovation"—prolonged for weeks, and months, and perhaps for years! But what is the state of a person, while this "slow process" is going on—neither one thing, nor the other—neither a sinner, nor a saint! And if taken out of time, while in this state, to what world shall he be consigned?

The religious phraseology of the *present day*, we consider of far less consequence than that of the Scriptures. We shall not stickle for the propriety of every word, or combination of words, by which persons have set forth "the process of becoming religious"—or described religion itself—or designated those whom they have regarded as religious. It would not be strange, if illiterate but well meaning persons have spoken improperly on this subject, as they do on most others. Still the objections of our author to many of the expressions on which he remarks, lie not so much, we are persuaded, against the phraseology, as against the sentiment. The words used give the meaning intended; but this meaning is not consistent with his particular views of truth. We cannot discover the impropriety of representing awakened and convicted sinners as "being anxious—being under concern—be-

ing struck under conviction"—or as "seeing the plague of their own hearts;" and when truly converted, as "being brought out of a state" of darkness; or as "meeting with a change of heart." They do indeed "shadow forth a painful process to be passed through" ordinarily by the hardened sinner, "in order to become religious;" and represent the change as instantaneous. But for this very reason, they are the terms of our choice; they express what we mean; and before we can be persuaded to relinquish them as improper, we must be satisfied of the impropriety of the sentiment they are intended to convey.

Nor can we see the impropriety of representing the newly converted as having an "interest in Christ," as "receiving comfort," and as "rejoicing" in hope; or of representing religion by the terms "grace" or "godliness;" or of representing Christians as feeling "a compassion for sinners, a love of the brethren," or a "love of souls." The most of these expressions are decidedly scriptural, and the objections of our author to them are decidedly unscriptural. For instance, feelings of rejoicing, he says, are "least of all proper to the commencement of a religious course." (p. 28.) But when the eunuch believed, and had been baptized, did he not go "on his way rejoicing?" And when the jailer and his family had been baptized, did he not "rejoice, believing in God with all his house?" On the same page in which feelings of rejoicing are objected to, as "least of all proper to the commencement of a religious course," the "serious and solemn affections" are objected to, as "not presenting a very attractive description

of true religion." But if our religious affections must be neither "serious and solemn," nor yet joyful; what must they be? What sort of feelings would our Unitarian friends have us to cherish, on the great subject of religion?

Our author complains, that Christians "are called converts, church members, professors, professing christians, the pious," &c. But really we have not sufficient light or acuteness to discover the impropriety of these appellations. If Christians have been truly converted, why may they not be denominated "converts?" If they have, like Timothy, "professed a good profession before many witnesses," and become members of the visible church of Christ; why may they not be called "professors, professing Christians," or "church members?" Or if they truly love, worship, and serve God, are they not "*pious*," and may not this epithet be justly applied to them? Why not call Christians, as well as others, by their right names, and speak of them according to their circumstances and characters?

Our author objects, generally, to the words and phrases on which we have remarked, that they "give a character of *indistinctness* to religion;" "*shelter heartlessness and hypocrisy*;" and, especially, that they "make religion a *peculiar thing*, and prevent its diffusion through the mass of society." (pp. 30—32.) But we do not ourselves believe that these objections are valid. Doubtless some may use the words under consideration, as they use other words, without attaching to them any very definite meaning. But the fault, in this case, lies not in the words,

but in the *habits* of the individuals concerned. They would use any other form of words that could be substituted, in the same way. And as to the charge of "heartlessness and hypocrisy," it is yet to be proved, that those to whom the words *grace*, and *godliness*, and *piety*, and a *change of heart*, and *love for souls* have become familiar, are less sincerely engaged in religion, than Unitarians. "By their *fruits* ye shall know them." Who then are *doing most*, for the religious instruction of the rising generation; for the establishment of religious institutions among the destitute of our own country; and for the spread of the gospel throughout the world? But the phraseology in question "tends to make religion a *peculiar thing*, and to prevent its diffusion through the mass of society." And what if it does? Is this an objection to it, or the contrary? We know the influence of names, and doubt not but it would be possible, by the adoption of a religious phraseology less distinctive and expressive than that left us in the Bible, to bring religion down so near to nothing, that those who care little or nothing for the subject, might be induced to embrace it. But a diffusion of religion such as this might better be called an *evaporation* of it—as the effect of it must soon be, to banish religion from the earth. Better, far better let the phraseology of the New Testament, and of Christians too, so far as theirs accords with the Bible, remain as it is; and if the pride of men cannot adopt it, they must reject it. If the world cannot be elevated to the standard of religion, let not religion be brought down to the level of a wicked world. Let "the form

of *sound words*," which we have heard from Christ and his holy Apostles, be strenuously retained; and if others cannot walk with us on conditions like these, they must be left to walk by themselves.

We close our remarks on this Tract, with presenting to our readers the following passage, which—though we think the sense might have been better expressed in a more scriptural phraseology—we in the main approve.

"How strong are the indirect intimations, which the scriptures give of the fallen and unhappy state of human nature. Every thing which we are taught concerning our duty, our interest, our spiritual welfare, points to our deficiency and danger. Thus the attainment of the true dignity, excellence, and happiness of our being, is called a salvation. It is a rescue,—it is an escape. It is not an early vigor, and a splendid improvement, but it is poverty, and weakness, and redemption that we hear of. It comes not to us with the beauty and joy of innocence, but under the humbler aspect and name of relief. The richest boon of our existence, you thus see, bears an inscription that testifies to our unworthiness. Observe, too, the characteristics and descriptions of this blessing. The commencement of all that is good within us, must needs be called a renovation; its progress is a conflict; its end is a release. The ritual expressions of it too, are baptismal waters, to wash away our sins, and the symbols of suffering and death, that was endured for us.

"There is then an implication pervading the whole scriptures of the most humbling nature. I had rather, says Dr. Paley, in speaking of that branch of the Christian evidence, which he has so acutely traced out in his *Hora Paulinæ*—I had rather at any time, surprise a coincidence in an oblique allusion, than read it in broad assertions. His meaning is, that it conveys more proof. And it is so with the subject before us. Stronger than all the direct accusations of guilt in the sacred writings, and more humbling and touching to our feelings, is the indirect and universal recognition in them of our unworthiness—the taking this for granted in the whole system of religion, which they mark out, and as it were, the involuntary aspect of distrust and appre-

hension, with which they regard our condition and prospect." pp. 22, 23.

The next Tract in the series is "a Letter on the Principles of the Missionary Enterprize," by Rev. Dr. Tuckerman, late of Chelsea. It is an earnest and animated discussion of the leading principles of Missionary effort; and, though not free from inconsistencies growing out of the religious sentiments of the author, is yet written with general ability, and with a good spirit. The principles to be illustrated, he describes as follows: 1. "A Christian sense of the moral and religious condition of those, who are living under the influences of heathenism, and of false religion," 2. "A deep and strong sense of the reality, and power, and worth of our religion; and of the inestimable blessings which it will not fail to impart to those, who shall cordially receive, and faithfully obey it." And 3. "God designs that man shall be his instrument, for imparting the blessings of Christianity to man."

Under the first of these particulars, which is that to which our remarks will be chiefly directed, Dr. T. urges the spiritual necessities of the heathen, not only from the direct representations of Scripture, and the testimony of Missionaries, but especially from the *untiring efforts* of our Lord and his Apostles, to improve their condition by imparting to them the Gospel. "Must not their condition," he asks, "have been *most deplorable*, to have excited this sympathy, this interest stronger than death, in their recovery?"

The single error of Dr. T., which we think it needful in this place to notice, is his repeated intimation, that the heathen, not-

withstanding their idolatry and consequent debasement, still are, or may be, in a *safe state*. "Our Lord uttered no denunciations against the mere offerers of a false worship; nor did his Apostles, great as was their zeal for the conversion of men, pronounce anathemas against them, merely as idolators." "The true view of heathenism is, not that it is a condition, in which, if a man die, he is therefore necessarily under eternal condemnation. Terrible thought; and most dishonorable alike to God and to Christianity!" "Paul saw not, nor did any of the Apostles see, in the heathen world, men who were doomed to endless perdition, only because they were Pagans."—"The *heathens are safe*, as far as that idolatry is concerned, the evil of which they know not." (pp. 14, 18, 36.) These, and other similar declarations, which occur in the first part of the Tract before us, are certainly fitted to leave the impression, that the heathen, though on several accounts they may be objects of pity, are yet, if sincere in their idolatrous practices, in a safe condition for eternity. Now this is a sentiment to which we cannot subscribe, and to which we much regret that any currency should have been given, by one who appears to feel so deeply for the heathen, as the writer of this Tract.

We object to this sentiment, because we think it *unscriptural*. Paul represents the end of heathenish worship and practices to be *eternal death*; and those who had been addicted to these practices as having lived without "hope, and without God in the world." (Rom. vi. 21. Eph. ii. 12.) He enumerates "*idolators*" among those, who shall "not in-

herit the kingdom of God." (1. Cor. vi. 9.) He farther assures us, that "as many as have sinned without law, shall *perish without law*;" and that a leading motive of all his exertions in behalf of the heathen was, that he might, if possible, "*save some*." (Rom. ii. 12. 1 Cor. ix. 22.)

We object farther to the sentiment in question, that it is inconsistent with the testimony of those who have had the best means of becoming acquainted with the moral state of the heathen. Gladly would we believe that the heathen might be saved, were there evidence that any considerable number of them appeared penitent and humble, and possessed a moral fitness for heaven. But it is painful to observe that all the accounts from them contain not only no evidence of this, but evidence the most indubitable to the contrary. After a twenty years' residence in India, Dr. Ward observes, "*I have never seen one man (in his heathen state) who appeared to fear God and work righteousness*. On the contrary, the language of the Apostle seems most strikingly applicable to them all: *There is none righteous, no, not one. There is none that understandeth; there is none that seeketh after God*." Another Missionary observes, "*As my acquaintance with the natives enlarges, I am increasingly convinced that there is scarcely one, who has the least pretension to any religious concern*."

The sentiment before us, to which some of the expressions of Dr. T. are fitted to give countenance, seems inconsistent with his representations in other parts of his Letter. "What," he asks, "is there that is low, what that is vicious, or what that is wretched, which was not comprehend-

ed in ancient, and which is not comprehended in modern, heathenism? There is nothing to be conceived, either of lewdness or of cruelty, which had not the sanctions of the religion of Greece and Rome, and which is not now a part of the idolatrous worship of the world. The vices were not incidental to this worship, but found, in some of its exercises, their very *spirit and life*. Our religion brings idolatry and false religion before us, as the history of all time represents them, as the *prolific mothers of all the vices and crimes, that can debase our nature, and disqualify for heaven*." (pp. 21, 14.) In connexion with representations such as these, to the truth of which we most heartily subscribe, to what purpose is it for Dr. T. to tell us, that the Apostles did not regard the heathen as in danger of perishing, "only because they were Pagans;" or that "the heathen are safe," so far as the mere fact of their idolatry is concerned?

We object finally to the sentiment under consideration, that it is fitted more perhaps than any other which could be advanced, to damp the ardor of Missionary zeal. It is the heart-stirring thought, that the heathen in general are living and dying in unpardoned sin, and "perishing for lack of vision," which, beyond every other, excites the sympathies, the prayers, and efforts of the friends of Missions. And we hazard nothing in predicting, that Dr. T. will labor in vain to arouse his Unitarian brethren to any great degree of feeling or exertion in the cause of Missions, until he convinces them of this solemn scriptural truth, and presses it home upon their hearts. Considering the

disadvantages of his religious system, we think he has done well, not only in the letter before us, but in his previous "Appeal to Liberal Christians, for the cause of Christianity in India." He has written with much earnestness, and with ability. But what great results have followed, or are likely to follow, as the fruit of his labours? While therefore, we thank him for his past efforts in a glorious cause, we cannot but ask him to look at the subject again. We hope he may

re-examine it with a view to ascertain, whether the system of faith, to which he adheres, possesses sufficient inherent warmth, and furnishes sufficiently powerful motives, to lead to great and vigorous Missionary exertions; and whether, in order to inspire men with the ardor of a Brainerd or a Martyn, he must not approximate much nearer than he is at present, to those views of religious truth, which they received, and which they taught.

Obituary Notices.

REV. HENRY H. F. SWEET.

THE REV. HENRY H. F. SWEET was the only son of Mr. Henry and Mrs. Lucinda Sweet, and was born in Attleborough, Massachusetts, November 1, 1796. In infancy his parents dedicated him to God in baptism, but his friends have no knowledge that he was the subject of religious impressions, till about the age of nineteen, when during a revival of religion in that place, he became, as he hoped, the subject of a saving change of heart, and in the autumn of 1816, he publicly professed his faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and united with the second Congregational Church in Attleborough, under the pastoral care of the Rev. N. Holman.

Soon after this he became desirous of obtaining a public education, that he might devote himself to the work of the ministry; and sometime in 1817 commenced preparation for college, and entered Brown University at Providence, Rhode Island, in the spring of 1818. In that place he obtained his classical education, and was graduated September, 1822.* He pursued the study of Theology in Medway, Massachusetts, under the direction of the Rev. J. Ide, and was licensed to preach the gospel, by Mendon Associ-

ation, in the autumn of 1823. November 9, 1825, he was ordained pastor of the Church in Palmer, and the last sermon he delivered was at the anniversary of his ordination."

"As a *Man*, Mr. Sweet was possessed of very amiable qualities. He was gentle, unassuming, and kind in his manners, and in his intercourse with others. Though he manifested much decision and firmness in whatever he deemed important in truth and duty, yet he seemed desirous to make others easy and happy around him. With strong social affections, and a cheerful turn of mind, he was formed to give pleasure to his friends, and to find enjoyment in their society. Possessed of an uncommon knowledge of human nature, for one of his years, and capable of turning this knowledge to good account, he was prepared to acquire, and to use in a wise manner, a great influence among those around him. No one, who was not lost to all sense of worth, could become acquainted with him, without esteeming and loving the man. His mind, though not brilliant, was above the ordinary level. It was not content with a superficial knowledge of things. Its conceptions were clear and methodical. Patient of investigation, logical in reasoning, it seemed fully to grasp and thoroughly to understand the subjects to which its powers were applied. It was evident that he had made the

* Mr. Sweet entered the Freshman class half advanced, and was out of College one year teaching school, in order to obtain means to prosecute his studies.

most of his opportunities of education. His mind was well disciplined, and he sustained a very respectable rank as a scholar.

As a *Preacher*, he was very interesting and impressive. His manner would not probably come up to the rules of that modern eloquence, which often pleases and astonishes, but lodges nothing in the mind as a reason for the effect; but it was sober, chaste, becoming the solemn subjects of eternity, judgment and salvation. He presented truth in a clear, lucid, understanding manner. The mind was filled with the subject, not with the preacher, and so that the heart and conscience felt a deep interest. If the sinner was excited, it was with the truth; if the Christian was edified, his thanks were given to the God of truth. His sermons were, therefore, as we should suppose, full of good matter well arranged, and urged by arguments happily chosen to carry conviction to the understanding and the heart. None could listen to them without being satisfied of the truth of what he attempted to prove; and the hearer could not well avoid feeling that the subject was the great thing which claimed his attention. Indeed he seemed, though unconsciously, to make the apostolic standard his own. "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord, and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake." At the same time, he had a low opinion of his own performances. They came so far short in his own apprehension, of what they ought to be, that he expressed his wish, near the close of his life, that they might never see the light. To shine, to be admired and applauded, to show himself, to be distinguished among his peers, did not seem to be in his thoughts, nor to enter into his motives of action; but to do good, to be useful, to preach the truth, to instruct and edify God's people, to bring sinners to repentance, to promote the cause of Christ, appeared written on all his labours as a minister.

He was, thoroughly, Calvinistic in his views of truth. The doctrines, which he derived from the Bible, were the doctrines of grace, which are mighty through God, and which he felt to be the grand instrument employed, by the Holy Ghost, to convert sinners and build up the kingdom of

Christ. These, with all their practical influence and effects upon the character, comprised the grand theme of his preaching.

As a *Pastor*, he seemed to be well fitted to his station. He was not hasty, but solemn, deliberate, wise, decided in managing all matters which related to the church. His intercourse with his people was calculated to conciliate their feelings, while at the same time it was suited to reclaim the wandering, and bring the backslider and the sinner to consideration and repentance. He favored, and set in operation, all those means, by which the children of the church are instructed, and revivals of religion promoted; and his gifts were well fitted to render the religious meeting profitable and to feed and nourish the lambs of the flock.

As a *Christian*, he indulged the comforting hope, that he had experienced renewing grace and was reconciled to God and justified, through the atonement and righteousness of Christ. He never spoke, with high confidence, of his religious attainments and experience. A deep sense of the evil of sin, of the holiness of God's law, of the remaining wickedness and deceitfulness of his own heart, seemed to make him very distrustful of himself. He appeared, therefore, to be clothed with humility, while, at the same time, he exhibited the cheerfulness of a good hope. While he leaned with confidence on Christ, he feared "lest after having preached to others he himself should be a cast-away." As he approached nearer the grave, Christ, in his whole character, and all the doctrines of salvation by grace appeared more and more precious to him. When he found himself sinking down to the grave, he experienced indeed some struggle with himself. He saw his prospects of usefulness in the church on earth,—of doing good to his friends, who were dependant upon him, and of labouring among the people of his choice and his love, about to be unexpectedly cut off. This, at first, seemed to try his faith and confidence, and to occasion some degree of dejection. But he soon rose above this trial, and was made willing to leave every thing which seemed to render life desirable, to leave his friends and his dear people, in the hands of God, and go, at the call of

his Saviour, through the dark valley of death to join the church triumphant in heaven. Although he had not such a lively and comforting sense of the presence and grace of Christ, as he earnestly wished to enjoy, yet his hope was as an anchor to his soul. The predominating exercise of his heart seemed to be repentance for sin; this, however, was mingled with such love to Christ and faith in his merits, that he was, indeed, all his salvation and all his desire. A short time before his death he partook of the sacrament of the supper with a few brethren. In this service we trust he received Christ afresh for righteousness and life.

If throughout his long and distressing sickness, he did not uniformly have strong consolation, yet peace, calmness, submission, and an earnest desire to glorify God, discovered a soul resting upon the rock of ages and prepared to enter upon the joys of the blessed. Whatever doubts troubled his mind, it was obvious that God was the centre of his affections, that there was none in heaven or on earth that he desired besides him. Thus died one, whose memory will be dear to this people, and who will be embalmed in the recollection of his friends.

Rev. Mr. Ely's Sermon.

Ordinations and Installations.

Installed, at Rochester, Ms. the Rev. JONATHAN BIGELOW, as Pastor of the Central Congregational Church in that town. Sermon by Rev. Mr. Storrs, of Braintree.

April 19,—At a meeting of the Presbytery of Hudson, held at Hopewell, Orange co. N. Y. the Rev. ROBERT ROY was ordained as an Evangelist.

April 20,—In the Parish of Prince George, Winyaw, S. C. by Bishop Bowen, the Rev. PAUL T. KEITH, assistant minister of that parish, was ordained a Priest.

April 25,—Rev. DANIEL S. SOUTHMAYD was ordained Pastor of the Trinitarian Chh. and Society in Concord, Mass. Sermon by Rev. Dr. Murdock, of Theological Seminary, Andover.

April 25,—Rev. WILLARD CHILD was installed Pastor of the Congregational Church in Pittsford, Vt. Sermon by Rev. Dr. Bates.

May 2,—Rev. HENRY B. HOOKER was installed as Pastor of the Congregational Church and Society in Lanesborough, Mass. Sermon by Rev. Mr. Walker, of Rutland, Vt.

May 4,—At an ordination held in St. Michael's Church in Bristol, R. I. by the Rt. Rev. Bp. Griswold, Mr. ROBERT B. DRANE was admitted to the Holy Order of Deacons. At the same place, and by the same, on Sunday, May 6, Mr. HENRY C. KNIGHT was admitted to the Holy Order of Deacons, and the Rev. JOHN BRISTED to the Order of Priests.

May 16,—Ordained at Columbia, (Waterbury) Conn. over the Congregational Church in that place, Rev. J. E. BRAY, late of N. Guilford.

May 19,—Rev. WILLIAM S. PLUMMER was ordained at Danville, Va. as an Evangelist, by the Presbytery of Orange. Sermon by Rev. James W. Douglass.

May 20,—Rev. E. EVANS, from Wales, was ordained as an Evangelist, by the New York Independent Association, in Providence Chapel, Thompson Street, New York. Sermon by Rev. S. Overton, New Jersey.

May 23,—Rev. DAVID PAGE SMITH was ordained over the Congregational Church and Society in Sandwich, N. H. Sermon by Rev. Jacob W. Eastman, of Methuen, Mass.

May 23,—Rev. EBENEZER COLMAN was installed Pastor of the Congregational Chh. in Swanzey, N. H. Sermon by Rev. Mr. Barstow, of Keene.

May 23,—Rev. RALPH S. CRAMPTON was ordained Pastor of the Congregational Church in South Woodstock, Con. Sermon by Rev. Mr. Hotchkiss, of Saybrook.

May 22,—Rev. ELDAH W. GOODMAN was installed as Pastor of the Congregational Church in Springfield, Vt. Sermon by Rev. P. Cook, of Acworth, N. H.

June 5,—Mr. SAMUEL NICHOLS was ordained as an Evangelist, at South Reading, by Andover Association. Sermon by Rev. J. Edwards, of Andover.

June 5,—Rev. JOHN WILDER, jr. was installed Pastor of the Calvinistic Congregational Society in Charlton, Mass. Sermon by Rev. Mr. Vaill, of Brimfield.

June 10,—At Richmond, Vir. the Rev. STEPHEN TAYLOR was installed Pastor of the Presbyterian Church on Shockoe Hill. Sermon by Rev. Wm. J. Armstrong.

Dr. Beecher's Sermons on Intemperance.

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